This sequencing matters. The Rafale debate was never about rejecting capability; it was about questioning whether India was acquiring capability without sufficient autonomy. The conclusion of the Rafale discussion was clear: without meaningful software control, weapons sovereignty, and deep localisation, even the most advanced aircraft risks becoming a strategically constrained asset.

The emergence of the Su-57E discussion does not overturn that conclusion. It reinforces it.

The question now confronting Indian airpower planners is not whether Rafale or Su-57 is superior. It is whether India can consciously assemble complementary platforms into a coherent force architecture—one that separates roles, absorbs risk intelligently, and advances autonomy rather than diluting it.

Nothing about the Rafale–Su-57 discourse negates the central argument that capability without autonomy is hollow. Software control, weapons sovereignty, and meaningful localisation remain non-negotiable principles.

India’s airpower gap today is functional rather than numerical. The Indian Air Force lacks a stealthy Day-One penetration platform optimised for deep strike and SEAD, a true fifth-generation air-dominance fighter, and a force structure that clearly distinguishes between penetration, orchestration, and sustained strike roles.

Rafale, particularly in its F4 and future F5 configurations, is best understood as a network-centric strike coordinator and sensor-fusion node. It excels in situational awareness, precision strike, and command-and-control functions, but it is not designed to spearhead penetration into heavily defended airspace on Day One without dedicated enablers.

The Su-57E, if inducted, must be understood correctly. It is not a silver-bullet air-superiority platform. Its relevance lies in its potential role as a stealth-enabled strike aircraft capable of penetrating contested airspace, delivering internal-bay weapons, and absorbing the highest operational risk—thereby reducing the burden on non-stealth platforms.

There is no contradiction between critiquing Rafale’s autonomy deficit and arguing for a Rafale–Su-57 combination. The combination only works if Rafale evolves into a sovereign command-and-network backbone and Su-57 is inducted as a limited-number penetration and SEAD asset. Neither can substitute for AMCA.

Weapons sovereignty remains the decisive factor. Aircraft do not fight wars; weapons ecosystems do. Any future architecture must ensure Indian weapons are first-class citizens, enable high–low mixes during sustained conflict, and prevent wartime readiness from being hostage to external approvals.

Operating two advanced foreign fighters is not inefficiency if sovereignty and leverage are preserved. Strategic optionality enhances bargaining power, mitigates political risk, and buys time for indigenous programmes without doctrinal stagnation.

AMCA remains the non-negotiable end state. Rafale and Su-57 are interim instruments, not destinations. If AMCA slips significantly, no combination of imported platforms will compensate for the resulting strategic vacuum.

The red line therefore remains unchanged: no platform is acceptable without autonomy, no combination is useful without weapons sovereignty, and no interim solution should undermine the indigenous end state.

India does not need more aircraft. It needs more control. Any acquisition that advances that objective deserves consideration. Any acquisition that does not—regardless of sophistication—remains capability on lease.

India now operates inside what senior policymakers describe as a “Triple Crisis.” The first pillar is the collapse of Iran as a stable western corridor. The second is an emboldened China preparing for a Taiwan contingency while hardening its continental periphery. The third is a transactional United States under President Donald Trump’s second term, which has reintroduced tariffs, sanctions, and alliance conditionality as blunt instruments of policy.

For New Delhi, this moment is not about choosing sides. It is about preserving sovereignty in an environment where neutrality itself is contested. The decisions India takes in 2026—on missile defence, continental access, and unresolved territorial questions—will determine whether it emerges as a stabilising continental power or remains constrained by geography and external vetoes.

1. THE GLOBAL CONTEXT: A WORLD HOSTILE TO MIDDLE POWERS

The post-Cold War era allowed states like India to extract benefits from multiple systems simultaneously. Energy from Russia and Iran, technology from the West, arms from diverse suppliers, and trade with China all coexisted under the umbrella of globalisation.

That system is now over.

Trump’s return to the White House has formalised a shift already underway: the United States no longer tolerates strategic freelancing by major partners. Sanctions are no longer targeted tools; they are systemic instruments of discipline. Tariffs are no longer economic measures; they are strategic weapons.

At the same time, China has concluded that time no longer favours peaceful unification with Taiwan. The PLA’s modernisation curve, demographic pressures, and technological parity with the West have compressed Beijing’s decision-making window. This has produced a militarised Indo-Pacific where escalation ladders are shorter and miscalculation more likely.

In this environment, India’s traditional balancing strategy—maintaining cordial relations with all while committing fully to none—has reached its limits.

1. THE PERSIAN PARADOX: IRAN AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE WESTERN CORRIDOR

For over two decades, Iran functioned as India’s indispensable strategic fallback. It offered energy security, access to Afghanistan, and a gateway to Central Asia that bypassed Pakistan entirely. In 2026, this pillar is crumbling.

Iran’s economy is experiencing systemic failure. Sanctions have intensified, oil revenues are constrained, and the national currency has collapsed to historic lows. The brief but destabilising “12-Day War” further exposed the regime’s vulnerabilities, triggering internal unrest that continues to simmer.

For India, the implications are profound. Iran is not merely a trading partner; it is the keystone of India’s westward continental strategy.

THE CHABAHAR DEADLOCK

Chabahar Port was conceived as India’s answer to strategic exclusion. It was designed to counter Gwadar, bypass Karachi, and give India autonomous access to Eurasia. Today, it stands at the centre of a diplomatic storm.

India is operating Chabahar under a US sanctions waiver set to expire on April 26, 2026. The waiver, initially justified on humanitarian grounds, has become politically inconvenient for Washington. On January 13, 2026, President Trump announced a 25 percent tariff on any country “doing business” with Iran.

India is already facing a 25 percent tariff penalty for importing Russian oil. An Iran-linked levy would push effective tariffs on Indian exports to as high as 75 percent—an economic shock that would be politically unsustainable.

In response, New Delhi is exploring a third-party operational model for Chabahar, seeking to preserve strategic presence while minimising direct state involvement. This legal manoeuvre reflects India’s shrinking diplomatic room for manoeuvre.

ECONOMIC FALLOUT AND DOMESTIC PRESSURE

The collapse of Iran has produced immediate economic consequences. Cargo worth over ₹2,000 crore—primarily basmati rice, tea, and pharmaceuticals—remains stranded at Indian ports due to payment failures.

Iran is India’s second-largest basmati buyer. Its sudden exit from the market caused domestic prices to crash by ₹5–8 per kilogram in a single week. For farmers and exporters, geopolitical abstraction has become lived reality.

THE REGIME CHANGE DILEMMA

Iran’s internal instability introduces another layer of risk. A US-backed regime change could reintegrate Iran into global markets—but at a strategic cost for India.

A secular, Western-aligned Tehran may seek rapprochement with Pakistan, diluting India’s influence and potentially backing Islamabad on Kashmir in exchange for Western support. Iran would shift from being a strategic hedge to a potential liability.

III. THE TRANSACTIONAL UNITED STATES AND INDIA’S SHRINKING SPACE

The Trump administration’s worldview is unambiguous: alliances are conditional, trade is leverage, and autonomy is tolerated only when it aligns with American interests.

India’s attempt to maintain independent energy sourcing—from Russia and potentially Iran—has collided with this reality. Washington now views strategic autonomy as defiance rather than partnership.

This has forced New Delhi to confront an uncomfortable truth: in a coercive international system, neutrality requires power.

1. THE HIMALAYAN CHESSBOARD: FROM DETERRENCE TO DENIAL

While India’s western flank weakens, its northern frontier is undergoing transformation. The near-completion of India’s S-400 air defence network has fundamentally altered the Himalayan military balance.

THE SUDARSHAN CHAKRA

By 2026, three S-400 regiments are operational across Punjab and Ladakh. Two more are scheduled by year’s end. Together, they create layered coverage capable of denying adversaries airspace deep into contested zones.

The strategic significance lies not in interception alone, but in denial. Chinese and Pakistani AWACS, tankers, and strike packages must now operate under constant threat. The vulnerability India faced during the 2020 Galwan crisis has been sharply reduced.

THE TAIWAN WINDOW

China’s preparations for a Taiwan contingency have forced the PLA to concentrate elite assets in the Pacific. This creates a temporary but meaningful opportunity for India.

Strategic choke points such as Depsang and Lanak La could be exploited to threaten the G219 Highway—the logistical spine connecting Xinjiang to Tibet. Disrupting this artery would impose disproportionate costs on China’s western posture.

Beijing may attempt to buy Indian neutrality through limited concessions along the LAC. But New Delhi’s calculus is shifting from conflict management to geography correction.

1. GILGIT-BALTISTAN: THE SOVEREIGN LAND BRIDGE

If Iran fails as a corridor, India faces a binary choice: accept continental enclosure or create its own pathway. The reclamation of Gilgit-Baltistan offers the only sovereign bypass.

Control of GB would provide India access to the Wakhan Corridor, linking it directly to Central Asia without reliance on Iran or Pakistan. More critically, it would sever the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

CPEC is China’s solution to the Malacca Dilemma. Cutting it would deny Beijing direct access to the Arabian Sea, restoring maritime chokepoint vulnerability and permanently neutralising the two-front threat against India.

The risks are immense—military escalation, nuclear signalling, international backlash. But so are the strategic dividends.

1. CHINA, TAIWAN, AND INDIA’S CONTINENTAL ROLE

India is uniquely positioned in a Taiwan crisis. It is the only major power capable of threatening China’s continental rear while remaining outside US alliance structures.

This gives New Delhi leverage—but only if it is willing to exercise it. Passive neutrality would forfeit strategic opportunity. Armed neutrality preserves autonomy while shaping outcomes.

VII. ARMED NEUTRALITY: A NEW INDIAN DOCTRINE

India’s emerging posture is neither non-alignment nor alliance politics. It is armed neutrality: the ability to say no because coercion is costly.

This doctrine rests on three pillars:
1. Strategic denial through missile defence and area control
2. Sovereign logistics and land access
3. Freedom of escalation management

Armed neutrality allows India to engage all powers without dependency on any.

CONCLUSION: THE SHATTERED BUFFER AND THE RENAISSANCE STATE

The collapse of Iran as a buffer, the coercive turn in US policy, and China’s continental ambitions have shattered the strategic comfort zone India once occupied.

But crisis also creates opportunity.

By completing its missile shield, reassessing continental corridors, and confronting unresolved territorial realities, India is beginning a sovereign renaissance. It is no longer merely reacting to great power competition; it is shaping the continental order.

The prize of the 2020s is not alignment—it is autonomy with teeth. India’s challenge is not to choose a side, but to ensure it never has to.

At an effective unit cost approaching USD 300–350 million per aircraft—once weapons, spares, training, infrastructure, upgrades, and lifecycle support are fully accounted for—the Rafale MRFA cannot be justified as a simple numbers-based replacement for retiring squadrons. At this price point, the aircraft must deliver something far more valuable than operational performance: long-term strategic leverage, freedom of action, and control over the systems that determine combat effectiveness in modern warfare.

The Rafale itself is not the problem. It is among the most capable 4.5-generation fighters in service, combat-proven, technologically mature, and adaptable across roles. The real issue lies in the terms under which India acquires, operates, upgrades, and fights with it.

India’s Revised Conditions: A Necessary but Insufficient Course Correction

Reportedly, India has placed a new set of conditions on the MRFA negotiations. These include mandatory integration of Indian weapons, secure Indian data links interoperable with national radar and sensor networks, modification of Rafale’s mission software to enable such integration, technology transfer from Safran for engines and Thales for avionics, and a mixed fleet composition of 90 Rafale F4 and 24 Rafale F5 aircraft. Additional upgrade demands reportedly include next-generation AESA radar, improved electronic warfare systems, long-range strike weapons, enhanced satellite connectivity, and AI-assisted targeting and decision-support.

These demands represent a significant shift from India’s historically passive procurement approach. They reflect an overdue recognition that modern airpower is software-defined. However, while the direction is correct, the depth of execution remains uncertain. Demanding integration is not the same as owning the architecture. Insisting on upgrades is not the same as controlling future evolution.

Software as the Center of Gravity

In contemporary air combat, superiority no longer emerges primarily from aerodynamic performance or engine thrust. It is generated by sensor-fusion algorithms that convert raw data into actionable awareness, mission-computer logic that prioritises threats and targets, electronic warfare libraries that adapt in real time, data-link architectures that compress the kill chain, and optimisation software that coordinates multiple platforms into a single combat system.

This software stack is where sovereignty truly resides. If Indian weapons and sensors are integrated through OEM-controlled interfaces, limited application programming interfaces (APIs), or certification-dependent modification pathways, India does not own the system. It merely customises a foreign architecture. Such an arrangement leaves operational freedom hostage to external approval cycles, upgrade permissions, and political considerations.

At USD 350 million per aircraft, anything short of deep mission-system authority is indefensible.

Rafale F5: A Combat Cloud Node, Not an Air-Dominance Fighter

The inclusion of the Rafale F5 variant fundamentally alters the nature of the proposed fleet. Often labelled “Super Rafale,” the F5 is not a traditional fighter upgrade focused on kinematics or dogfighting performance. Instead, it represents France’s entry into distributed, network-centric warfare, expected to mature around 2030.

The Rafale F5 is designed to function as a command-and-control node within a broader combat cloud. Central to this concept is manned–unmanned teaming, with the F5 expected to control nEUROn-derived unmanned combat aerial vehicles. These UCAVs would perform forward ISR in contested airspace, conduct suppression of enemy air defences using stealthy or expendable drones, execute stand-off jamming, and act as decoys to saturate enemy sensors.

In this model, the Rafale transitions from being a shooter to a battle manager. Its value lies less in the number of missiles it carries and more in its ability to orchestrate a distributed fight across platforms and domains.

Deep Strike and Strategic Architecture

The Rafale F5 is also being designed around France’s future strategic weapons ecosystem, including the ASN4G hypersonic nuclear missile and the FMAN/FMC next-generation cruise and anti-ship missile family. India will not gain access to these weapons. However, the architecture that supports them—high-throughput data links, extreme computational capacity, resilient sensor fusion, and hardened electronic warfare systems—is precisely what makes the platform attractive.

Key upgrades are expected to include a fibre-optic internal data backbone capable of handling AI-scale data fusion, an evolved RBE2-XG AESA radar reportedly optimised for detecting low-observable targets beyond 200 kilometres, and a significantly enhanced SPECTRA electronic warfare suite capable of coordinated cyber-electronic operations and multi-platform defensive bubbles.

In essence, the Rafale F5 is less a fighter aircraft and more a flying combat server—exceptionally well-suited for deep penetration, SEAD, and networked strike missions. But this sophistication does not equate to air dominance.

The Air Superiority Gap and the AMCA Clock

Even in its most advanced configuration, the Rafale cannot substitute for a true fifth-generation air-superiority platform. It lacks full-spectrum stealth, does not possess the kinematic dominance required to consistently outmatch peer fighters, and was not designed around the philosophy of first-day, first-hour air dominance against a technologically equivalent adversary.

This creates a strategic dilemma for India. If the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme enters service on schedule, the Rafale F4/F5 fleet can function as a powerful interim force multiplier—handling SEAD, strike, and networked operations while AMCA assumes the air-dominance role. However, if AMCA continues to slip, India risks entering the mid-2030s with one of the world’s largest air forces but without a platform optimised for air superiority.

No amount of networking can fully compensate for that deficit.

The Weapons Lock-In Problem

Perhaps the most underappreciated vulnerability in the Rafale ecosystem is weapons dependence. India’s existing Rafale fleet relies overwhelmingly on French munitions. In peacetime, this is an accounting concern. In wartime, it is a strategic risk.

SCALP-EG is among the world’s most effective deep-strike cruise missiles. AASM HAMMER offers unmatched modular precision. Meteor remains the gold standard in beyond-visual-range combat. Yet these weapons are also among the most expensive in service.

In a prolonged, high-intensity conflict, stockpiles deplete faster than procurement cycles can replenish them. Wartime expenditure rates explode. Resupply becomes a political decision rather than a technical transaction. No serious military power structures its warfighting doctrine around foreign ammunition dependence, especially when facing peer adversaries.

France, Israel, Russia—and the Integration Deadlock

India’s traditional strength lies in its hybrid defence ecosystem. Israeli seekers and sensors, Russian propulsion and missile kinematics, and indigenous software logic have historically coexisted across Indian platforms. France, however, operates under a very different philosophy.

Paris is deeply cautious—often openly resistant—to Israeli electronics interfacing with French weapons, Russian systems operating near sensitive Western avionics, and deep software access that risks intellectual property exposure or cyber vulnerabilities. These concerns are rational from a French perspective. But they create a structural contradiction.

India seeks an open, sovereign weapons ecosystem. France prefers a controlled, self-contained architecture. Unless India secures genuine mission-system authority, Indian weapons risk being relegated to secondary, constrained integrations on the most expensive platform in the Indian inventory.

Localisation: 30 Percent Is Indefensible, 60 Percent Is the Floor

Localisation is the decisive fault line in the MRFA debate. Thirty percent localisation at USD 350 million per aircraft is economically and strategically indefensible. It primarily funds French R&D, sustains French industrial capacity, and finances future French upgrades, while Indian industry remains a manufacturing subcontractor.

For the MRFA to qualify as a strategic partnership, localisation must begin at 60 percent and include engine manufacturing with hot-section technology transfer, avionics and mission-system co-development, software source-code access or escrow, and independent long-term upgrade rights. Without these, India pays for capability without acquiring control.

Conclusion: Conditional Wisdom or Strategic Failure

The revised Rafale MRFA is no longer automatically indefensible. But it remains one weak clause away from becoming one of the most expensive strategic miscalculations in Indian defence history.

Rafale F5 is a formidable SEAD and combat-cloud platform. It does not resolve India’s air-dominance requirement. Without weapons sovereignty and deep localisation, it becomes an over-engineered liability rather than a force multiplier.

In modern warfare, aircraft elegance matters less than control over code, weapons, and replenishment. India does not need the best fighter on paper. It needs the freedom to fight without asking permission.

The Atlantic alliance is not collapsing under external pressure; it is being torn apart from within. Donald Trump’s recent attacks on Europe—branding the European Union as strategically freeloading, culturally hollow, and increasingly hostile to American interests— are not mere campaign theatrics. They are signals of a deeper structural shift: the United States no longer views a unified, autonomous Europe as an asset. It sees it as a potential rival.

From New Delhi, this rupture is being watched with cold clarity. India understands power transitions. It understands that alliances endure only as long as interests align. What we are witnessing today is not a disagreement over Ukraine or immigration—it is the early phase of a strategic divorce between America and Europe in a rapidly hardening multipolar world.

Europe Was Never Meant to Be Powerful Again

Post–Second World War Europe was designed to be prosperous, not powerful. Under American stewardship, the continent was encouraged to integrate economically while outsourcing its security to Washington. NATO became both protector and constraint. Europe grew rich, technologically advanced, and politically influential—but militarily dependent.

That arrangement suited the United States perfectly.

Today, it no longer holds. Europe is a consolidated geopolitical unit with immense industrial depth, advanced research ecosystems, rare technological capabilities, and access to global capital. What it lacked—strategic ambition—it is now rediscovering.

France, Nuclear Power, and the Return of European Hard Power

France has emerged as the spearhead of Europe’s strategic reawakening. Paris has openly pushed the idea of a European nuclear shield anchored in French deterrence, fundamentally altering the continent’s security architecture.

Alongside this, Europe is pursuing two sixth-generation fighter programs and the Eurodrone initiative—clear indicators that the continent is preparing for future high- intensity warfare without automatic American support.

Ukraine: Where the Break Became Permanent

Europe’s categorical rejection of any settlement involving Ukrainian territorial concessions stands in direct opposition to Trump’s transactional worldview. Ukraine has become the litmus test of Europe’s strategic credibility.

Culture, Immigration, and Strategic Decay

Trump’s criticism of Europe’s demographic transformation touches an uncomfortable truth. Uncontrolled illegal immigration has strained social cohesion and internal security. Europe’s liberal leadership reacts with ideological defensiveness rather than reform.

Europe’s Military Amnesia Is Ending

Europe’s post-war pacifism was strategic outsourcing. Ukraine ended that illusion. Rearmament has begun, doctrines are changing, and history has returned.

A Multipolar World Cannot Accommodate a Subordinate Europe

A militarily autonomous Europe is not a revisionist threat but a system competitor. Trump’s pressure politics only accelerate Europe’s desire for independence.

The Indian Calculation

India views this shift structurally, not emotionally. A stronger Europe offers diversification. American unpredictability reinforces India’s doctrine of strategic autonomy.

Conclusion: From Alliance to Transaction

The transatlantic relationship is being downgraded—from alliance to transaction. Europe is asserting autonomy. America is demanding obedience. In a multipolar world, equals do not submit. Power, once reclaimed, is never voluntarily surrendered.

Early Beginnings

India’s electronics journey began in the 1960s with the establishment of public sector units like Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) and Electronics Corporation of India Limited (ECIL). However, the industry remained largely focused on defense and telecommunications equipment with limited consumer electronics production.

The Lost Decades (1990s-2000s)

Despite the IT services boom, India missed the global electronics manufacturing wave. Key challenges included:

• – High import duties on components
• – Complex regulatory framework
• – Inadequate infrastructure
• – Limited skilled workforce
• – Absence of a comprehensive electronics policy

Import Dependency Crisis

By 2010, India had become the world’s second-largest importer of electronics, with imports reaching $45 billion while exports remained minimal at $5 billion, creating a massive trade deficit.

Present State (2014-2025)

Market Size and Growth

• Current Market Value: $155 billion (2024) [Industry estimates]
•  Production Value: Over 8.2 trillion Indian rupees (approximately $101 billion) in 2023 [Statista, 2024]
• Annual Growth Rate: 15-20% [Industry reports]
• Employment: Over 4.5 million people directly employed [Government data]
• Export Growth: Electronics exports have surged from INR 382.6 billion (US$4.5 billion) in 2014-15 to INR 2.41 trillion (US$28.45 billion) in 2023-24, reflecting a CAGR of 22.7 percent [Ministry of Electronics and IT]

Key Segments

1. Mobile Phones: Largest segment accounting for 50% of production. India’s smartphone market grew 4% YoY in 2024, with shipments reaching 151 million units [IDC Worldwide Quarterly Mobile Phone Tracker]
2. Consumer Electronics: TVs, audio systems, home appliances – Consumer electronics market valued at USD 80.8 billion in 2024, expected to reach USD 149.1 billion by 2033 [Custom Market Insights, 2024]
3. Electronic Components: Semiconductors, PCBs, displays
4. Industrial Electronics: Medical devices, automotive electronics
5. IT Hardware: Laptops, tablets, servers

Manufacturing Hubs

Tamil Nadu: Chennai (mobile phones, components)

Karnataka: Bengaluru (IT hardware, R&D)

Uttar Pradesh: Noida, Greater Noida (mobile manufacturing)

Haryana: Gurugram, Manesar (automotive electronics)

Andhra Pradesh: Sri City (electronics manufacturing)

Gujarat: Ahmedabad (electronic components)

Government Initiatives and Policy Framework

National Policy on Electronics (NPE) 2019

Vision: Position India as a global hub for Electronics System Design and Manufacturing (ESDM) [Prime Minister’s Office, 2019]

Targets by 2025 [Official Government Document]:

• Turnover of $400 billion (approximately INR 26,00,000 crore)
• Targeted production of 1.0 billion (100 crore) mobile handsets valued at $190 billion
• Exports of $120 billion
• Employment for 10 million people

Major Government Schemes

Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme

Launch: 2020

Budget: ₹76,000 crores across multiple sectors

Coverage:

• Mobile manufacturing and components
• IT hardware (laptops, tablets, servers)
• Telecom equipment
• Electronic components and semiconductors

Latest Updates (2024-2025):

• New PLI scheme worth ₹22,919 crore approved for electronic components manufacturing
• Mobile phone exports rose from ₹228 billion (2020-21) to ₹1.2 trillion (2023-24), achieving 78% compound annual growth rate
• Industry seeks additional ₹35,000 crore PLI support to increase domestic value addition from 18% to 35-40% in mobile manufacturing

Success Metrics:

• Mobile exports increased from $2.6 billion (2020-21) to $14.4 billion (2023-24)
• Apple iPhone production value crossed $7 billion in India

Modified Special Incentive Package Scheme (M-SIPS)

• Capital subsidy of 20-25% for investments in electronics manufacturing
• Reimbursement of countervailing duty/excise duty for 10 years

Electronic Manufacturing Clusters (EMC)

• Development of world-class infrastructure for electronics manufacturing
• 20+ EMCs approved across different states

Design Linked Incentive (DLI) Scheme

• Budget: ₹76,000 crores over 6 years
• Focus: Semiconductor design, chip development, and R&D

State-Level Initiatives

• Tamil Nadu: Electronics hardware manufacturing policy with land allocation and subsidies
• Karnataka: Aerospace and Electronics Policy with focus on R&D
• Uttar Pradesh: Electronics manufacturing policy with single-window clearance
• Telangana: T-Hub for electronics startups and innovation

Key Indian Industry Leaders

Manufacturing Companies

• Dixon Technologies: Leading ODM/EMS player
• Amber Enterprises: Air conditioning and consumer appliances
• Voltas: Home appliances and cooling solutions
• Havells: Electrical equipment and consumer durables
• Bajaj Electricals: Consumer appliances and lighting

Semiconductor and Components

1. Tata Electronics: Semiconductor assembly and testing
2. Vedanta-Foxconn: Joint venture for semiconductor manufacturing
3. L&T Semiconductor: Chip design and manufacturing services
4. Saankhya Labs: Semiconductor design for broadcast and broadband

Contract Manufacturing

1. Foxconn India: Major iPhone assembler
2. Wistron: Apple supplier for iPhone assembly
3. Flextronics: EMS services
4. Jabil: Electronic manufacturing services

Global Context and Competition

Global Electronics Manufacturing Landscape

Total Market Size: $2.4 trillion globally

Major Manufacturing Hubs:

• China: 28% of global production
• South Korea: 12% of global production
• Taiwan: 8% of global production
• Japan: 7% of global production
• India: 3% of global production (2024)

China Plus One Strategy

The global supply chain diversification post-COVID-19 has benefited India:

• Companies relocating: Apple, Samsung, Xiaomi, Oppo, Vivo
• Geopolitical tensions: US-China trade war accelerating relocation
• Supply chain resilience: Companies seeking alternative manufacturing bases

Competitive Advantages

• Large domestic market: 1.4 billion consumers
• Cost-competitive labor: 30-40% lower than China
• English-speaking workforce: Advantage in global operations
• Government support: Strong policy backing and incentives
• Democratic stability: Predictable business environment

Challenges Against Global Competition

• Infrastructure gaps**: Power, logistics, ports
• Component ecosystem**: Heavy dependence on imports (70%)
• Skilled workforce**: Need for technical training
• R&D investment**: Lower than global competitors
• Ease of doing business**: Regulatory complexities

Future Outlook and Projections

Market Projections

• 2025: $300 billion market size, $120 billion production
• 2030: $500 billion market size, $300 billion production
• Export potential: $100+ billion by 2030

Emerging Opportunities

Semiconductor Manufacturing

• India Semiconductor Mission: $10 billion incentive package

1. Major Projects Progress (2024-2025):

• Micron Technology: $2.75 billion OSAT facility in Sanand, Gujarat – first chips expected by mid-2025
• Tata Electronics: ₹27,000 crore ATMP facility in Morigaon, Assam – capacity of 48 million chips daily
• CG Power: ₹7,600 crore ATMP facility in partnership with Renesas Electronics – capacity of 15 million chips daily
• Fab facilities: 3-4 major fabs planned by 2030, with Tata’s mega semiconductor fab approved for Dholera, Gujarat
• Compound semiconductors: Focus on GaN, SiC for 5G and automotive

2. Electric Vehicle Electronics

• EV adoption: 30% of vehicle sales by 2030
• -Battery manufacturing: Gigafactory investments
• Charging infrastructure: Electronics for EV ecosystem

3. 5G and Telecom Equipment

• 5G rollout: Massive infrastructure upgrade
• Indigenous 5G: Development of Indian 5G technology stack
• Network equipment: Import substitution opportunities

4. Defense Electronics

• Atmanirbhar Bharat: Self-reliance in defense
• Offset requirements: Technology transfer and local production
• Export potential: Defense electronics to friendly nations

Strategic Initiatives for 2025-2030

1. Semiconductor Ecosystem Development

• Establish 3-4 major semiconductor fabs
• Develop compound semiconductor capabilities
• Create 50+ chip design companies
• Build complete supply chain ecosystem

2. Component Localization

• Reduce import dependency from 70% to 40%
• Develop local PCB manufacturing
• Establish display manufacturing facilities
• Build passive component manufacturing base

3. R&D and Innovation

• Increase R&D spending to 3% of turnover
• Establish 20+ electronics R&D centers
• Create university-industry partnerships
• Develop IP and patents portfolio

4. Skill Development

• Train 1 million skilled technicians
• Establish electronics-focused ITIs
• Create industry-academia partnerships
• Develop advanced manufacturing skills

Investment Landscape

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

• Total FDI (2014-2024): $15+ billion in electronics
• Major investors: Foxconn, Samsung, Apple, Xiaomi
• Investment pipeline: $25+ billion committed for 2024-2027

Government Investment

• PLI allocation: ₹76,000 crores approved
• Infrastructure development: ₹50,000 crores for EMCs
• Semiconductor mission: ₹76,000 crores over 6 years

Private Sector Investment

• Tata Group: $2 billion in semiconductor and electronics
• Reliance: $1.5 billion in electronics manufacturing
• Adani Group: $1 billion in data center and electronics

Challenges and Risk Factors

Short-term Challenges (2025-2027)

• Supply chain disruptions: Geopolitical tensions
• Skilled workforce shortage: Technical talent gap
• Infrastructure bottlenecks: Power, logistics, water
• Component import dependency: 70% imports continue

Medium-term Challenges (2027-2030)

• Technology advancement**: Keeping pace with global innovation
• Competition from Vietnam/Mexico**: Alternative manufacturing bases
• Environmental regulations**: Sustainability requirements
• Trade policy changes**: Global trade dynamics

Long-term Strategic Risks

• Technological disruption: New manufacturing technologies
• Geopolitical shifts: Changes in global supply chains
• Climate change impact: Environmental sustainability
• Automation: Impact on employment-intensive manufacturing

Success Metrics and KPIs

Current Performance (2024-2025)

• Production: Over 8.2 trillion Indian rupees (approximately $101 billion) [Statista, 2024]
• Exports: INR 2.41 trillion (US$28.45 billion) [Ministry of Electronics and IT]
• Employment: 4.5 million
• FDI: Rs. 49,068 crore cumulative (US$ 5.67 billion) [IBEF, 2024]
• Component import dependency: Reduced from 85% to 70%
• Mobile manufacturing: Surged 21 times to reach US$ 49.3 billion [IBEF, 2024]

Targets for 2030

• Production: $300+ billion
• Exports: $100+ billion
• Employment: 10+ million
• Global market share: 8-10%

Conclusion

India’s electronics manufacturing industry stands at a critical juncture with unprecedented opportunities driven by global supply chain shifts, strong government support, and a large domestic market. The successful implementation of PLI schemes, development of semiconductor capabilities, and creation of a robust component ecosystem will determine India’s ability to become a global electronics manufacturing hub.

The industry’s transformation from a net importer to a significant exporter in mobile phones demonstrates the potential for replicating this success across other electronics segments. However, sustained focus on infrastructure development, skill creation, R&D investment, and policy consistency will be crucial for achieving the ambitious targets set for 2030.

With the right strategic execution, India has the potential to capture 8-10% of global electronics production and emerge as the world’s third-largest electronics manufacturer after China and South Korea by 2030.

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A prime example was Operation Sindoor, a classified SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) exercise, which saw Indian forces deploy Haroop loitering drones in coordination with modernized L-70, Zu-23, and Schilka air defense systems, now equipped with airburst ammunition. This wasn’t
just a test of drone strike capabilities-it was a demonstration of multi-domain integration, where unmanned platforms were woven seamlessly into layered air defense structures, culminating in the protection of strategic assets like the S-400 ‘Sudarshan Chakra’.

India’s multi-layered air defense network, incorporating Akash, SAMAR, and MRSAM systems, now serves as a model of strategic foresight. These systems provide overlapping coverage from low to medium altitudes, ensuring that critical assets such as the S-400 remain shielded from saturation
strikes, cruise missiles, and loitering drones. This tiered defense has positioned India well ahead of regional and even global counterparts, including Russia, which has seen its premier air defense systems compromised in recent battlefield conditions.

The war in Ukraine has become a vivid case study on this front. Ukrainian forces have repeatedly used low-cost drones to disable Russia’s advanced air defense assets, including multiple confirmed strikes on S-400 systems in Crimea and Yevpatoria. Coordinated drone and missile attacks, combined with first-person-view (FPV) drones, have devastated Russian airbases and exposed how traditional military superiority can be undone by inexpensive, autonomous systems.

The implications are profound. Drones like Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 have already demonstrated that a $1 million UAV can deliver the same or greater impact than a $20 million cruise missile. If nations such as Iran, Syria, Yemen, or Pakistan develop and mass-produce such technologies, the global
balance of power could shift toward a doctrine of economic exhaustion-where the cost to defend becomes unsustainable against the cost to attack.

India has anticipated this shift. Indigenous systems like Bhargavastra, capable of targeting drone swarms with micro-rockets, have already been deployed. Alongside them are laser and microwave-based directed energy weapons, smart anti-drone ammunition, and advanced counter-unmanned aerial systems like Indrajaal. These capabilities are supported by an emerging doctrine that places drone warfare not as a side component-but at the core of strategic planni

Yet India’s innovation doesn’t end in the sky. With the upcoming stealth UCAV powered by a dry Kaveri engine-designed for launch from Indian aircraft carriers India will gain deep-strike capabilities across maritime zones without risking manned assets. Additionally, the CATS Warrior loyal wingman UAV, operating in tandem with the Tejas and upcoming AMCA stealth fighter, represents the cutting edge of manned-unmanned teaming. With artificial intelligence driving real-time coordination, India’s Air Force is entering a post 5th generation battlespace.

This isn’t just about new platforms it’s about new thinking. Indian defense planners are not reacting to the future; they are building it. Even as radical groups near India’s eastern borders grow in capability, and vulnerabilities along corridors like the Chicken’s Neck increase, India is moving
proactively to deploy compact radar systems, C-UAS platforms, and real-time drone neutralization technologies to prevent infiltration, sabotage, or surveillance by small UAVs.

Ultimately, India’s advantage lies not just in the machinery it builds, but in the coherence of its strategic vision. From DRDO labs to frontline deployments, there is a singular understanding: drone warfare is not an accessory to conventional power-it is the defining theatre of the next war. The
nations that master autonomy, artificial intelligence, and layered defenses will shape the battlefield of the 21st century. And India, it appears, intends to lead from the front.

In the emerging new world order, where alliances are fragile and aggression is normalized, India can no longer afford the luxury of restraint. The era of cautious diplomacy must now evolve into a new doctrine—Strategic Assertion. To safeguard national interest and project its power as a credible counter to expansionist forces, India must move beyond its shores. With China’s militarization of the South China Sea, Turkey’s deepening ties with Pakistan and aggression in the Mediterranean, and the United States’ inconsistent reliability, India must establish forward-operating bases with trusted partners—Armenia, Cyprus, Greece in the West, and friendly ASEAN nations in the East. This is not about provocation —it’s about protection, presence, and principle.

The Western Gateway: Armenia, Cyprus & Greece

Armenia, locked in a battle of survival against Turkish-Azerbaijani aggression, has turned to India as a partner for long-term defense cooperation. This alliance goes beyond arms deals—it is civilizational alignment, forged in resilience and a shared understanding of sovereignty.

Cyprus, straddling the edge of Europe and West Asia, offers an ideal outpost to watch over maritime commerce, monitor Chinese movements, and challenge Turkey’s unchecked influence.

Greece, another civilizational state and maritime democracy, provides India with a valuable NATO-aligned partner, opening the door for docking rights, joint drills, and forward-based logistics.

Indian Systems as Symbols of Stability

The deployment of Tejas, Tejas Mk2, BrahMos-NG, Akash SAMs, and the Gandiva BVR missile will do more than deter aggression—they will inspire confidence among partners. For nations like Armenia and Greece, these systems represent not just military protection but non-aligned sovereignty backed by a reliable power.

The integration of Ghatak stealth UCAVs for deep reconnaissance missions—especially with shared intelligence from host nations—will create a live security dome around volatile regions.

Occasional deployment of India’s P-8I Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft, along with upcoming surveillance drones and India’s strategic intelligence assets, will help maintain constant maritime domain awareness and strengthen India’s intelligence web across conflict zones.

Look East: Eyes on the South China Sea

China’s unlawful claims and militarized islands threaten not only sovereignty of smaller nations but global trade itself. India cannot afford a passive posture in the Indo-Pacific.

Strategic engagement with Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia must include shared access to facilities, joint naval exercises, drone patrol networks, and crisis logistics capabilities. These partnerships will transform India’s role from regional balancer to Indo-Pacific stabilizer

INS Vishal: Naval Sovereignty Manifest

At the heart of this vision stands INS Vishal—a 75,000-tonne nuclearpowered aircraft carrier, envisioned for 2035. This is more than a ship. It is India’s statement of intent: to be at sea, to stay at sea, and to command the sea:

• Unlimited endurance via nuclear propulsion
• EMALS technology to launch next-gen fighters like TEDBF and Tejas Mk2
• Indigenous construction to symbolize true Atmanirbharta

Budget for Power, Vision for Peace

India’s current defense budget—hovering around 2 per cent of GDP—is insufficient for the strategic responsibilities it now bears. An increase to 3.5 per cent of GDP is no longer optional. It is an imperative.

• Overseas basing infrastructure and host-nation agreements
• Sealift, airlift, and rapid deployment logistics
• Surveillance and A2/AD networks
• Integrated intelligence-sharing platforms with allies

Lessons from the Past, Compass for the Future

India must not repeat its post-Independence hesitation—like the missed strategic opportunity in Singapore. While others consolidated power, India held back. The world has changed, and so must we.

India must not dilly-dally in denial of its destiny. China bullied Sri Lanka and Maldives with debt and proxies, right in India’s backyard. India may not yet be as rich as China, but vision, strategy, and resolve are worth more than borrowed billions.

Our Vision 2047 must be to learn from the silence of the past, and speak through strength in the future

Final Word: India Must Be the Winter Sun

India’s foreign policy must be like the winter sun—not harsh, but warm. In times when cold, treacherous winds freeze the growth of friends in the Mediterranean and the Far East, India must be their midday warmth—subtle but sustaining, gentle but unwavering.

Let China buy silence.
Let others threaten chaos.
Let India be the strategic conscience of the Global South—reliable, radiant, and ready.

The semiconductor narrative has become dangerously narrow. While industry observers fixate on the relentless pursuit of nanometer milestones—3nm today, 2nm tomorrow—a more profound transformation is unfolding in India’s approach to chip manufacturing. The country’s decision to establish commercial production capabilities at 28nm and 90nm nodes represents not technological compromise, but strategic clarity.

This positioning reflects a sophisticated understanding of market dynamics that transcends the silicon valley echo chamber’s obsession with cutting-edge processes. India is not merely entering the semiconductor race; it is redefining the track itself.

The Fallacy of the Nanometer Arms Race

Silicon Valley’s fixation on process node advancement has created a dangerous blind spot in strategic thinking. The assumption that technological leadership requires pushing the absolute boundaries of physics has left entire market segments underserved and geopolitically vulnerable.

Consider the reality: automotive electronics, industrial IoT, power management systems, and edge computing infrastructure—the backbone of our increasingly connected world—operate primarily on mature nodes. The global chip shortage of 2020-2022 was not about 3nm availability; it was about access to the 28nm, 40nm, and 90nm processes that power everything from car infotainment systems to medical devices.

India’s semiconductor strategy recognizes this fundamental market truth. By establishing capabilities in these proven technologies, the country is addressing real demand rather than chasing technological prestige. This approach demonstrates the kind of pragmatic leadership that transforms markets rather than simply following them.

Architectural Thinking in a Component-Obsessed World

The most sophisticated aspect of India’s approach lies not in the chips themselves, but in the ecosystem thinking that underpins the strategy. Building semiconductor manufacturing capability requires orchestrating a complex symphony of materials science, precision engineering, supply chain logistics, and human capital development.

India’s $10 billion commitment to semiconductor incentives represents an investment in this entire ecosystem. The partnerships with companies like Micron, the establishment of design centers, and the integration with the IndiaAI Mission reveal a country thinking architecturally about technological sovereignty.

This holistic approach contrasts sharply with the fragmented strategies employed by many developed economies, where semiconductor policy often treats chip manufacturing as an isolated industrial capability rather than the foundation of broader technological independence.

Geopolitical Sophistication in Technology Strategy

The current semiconductor landscape resembles a high-stakes game of geopolitical chess, with Taiwan serving as the critical piece that every major power seeks to protect or control. India’s entry into this space represents a masterclass in strategic positioning.

Rather than attempting to directly challenge TSMC’s dominance in advanced nodes—a battle that would require decades and hundreds of billions of dollars in investment—India is creating an alternative value proposition. The country offers political stability, democratic governance, English-language capabilities, and a massive domestic market that can absorb initial production while building scale.

This positioning becomes particularly compelling as Western corporations seek to de-risk their supply chains. India provides a democratic alternative to authoritarian manufacturing bases without the geopolitical vulnerabilities that make Taiwan-centric strategies increasingly untenable.

The Compound Returns of Industrial Policy

India’s semiconductor initiative exemplifies the kind of patient capital thinking that builds enduring competitive advantages. The immediate goal is not to capture market share from established players, but to develop the institutional knowledge and manufacturing expertise that can compound over decades.

The progression from 28nm to sub-20nm capabilities represents a learning curve that cannot be purchased or licensed—it must be earned through experience. Each wafer processed, each yield optimization achieved, and each process refinement discovered builds toward capabilities that will eventually enable India to compete at the technological frontier.

This approach mirrors the strategies employed by South Korea and Taiwan in their own semiconductor development journeys. Both countries began with mature technologies and licensing agreements before developing indigenous capabilities that eventually challenged global leaders.

Market Creation Through Strategic Patience

The most underappreciated aspect of India’s strategy is its potential to create entirely new market categories. As artificial intelligence applications proliferate beyond data centers into edge computing, automotive systems, and industrial automation, the demand for specialized chips optimized for specific use cases will explode.

India’s manufacturing capabilities, combined with its software expertise and massive domestic market, position the country to become a leader in application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and system-on-chip (SoC) solutions tailored for emerging AI applications. These markets do not require the absolute performance of leading-edge nodes, but they do require cost optimization, power efficiency, and manufacturing scale—precisely India’s strategic focus areas.

The Innovation Ecosystem Effect

Semiconductor manufacturing creates what economists call “knowledge spillovers”—the diffusion of technical expertise across related industries. India’s chip fabs will generate expertise in precision manufacturing, materials science, and process engineering that will benefit industries far beyond semiconductors.

The country’s established strength in software development, combined with emerging hardware manufacturing capabilities, creates the potential for integrated solutions that address entire system requirements rather than individual components. This systems-level thinking represents a significant competitive advantage in markets where customers increasingly demand end-to-end solutions rather than discrete products.

Redefining Success Metrics

The global technology industry’s obsession with benchmarking and rankings has created perverse incentives that prioritize measurable metrics over strategic outcomes. India’s semiconductor strategy suggests a more sophisticated approach to defining success.

Rather than competing on pure performance metrics, India is optimizing for strategic autonomy, supply chain resilience, and long-term industrial development. This approach recognizes that sustainable competitive advantage comes not from winning individual technology races, but from building enduring institutional capabilities that can adapt to changing market conditions.

The Compounding Nature of Technological Sovereignty

India’s semiconductor initiative must be understood within the broader context of the country’s digital transformation agenda. The integration of chip manufacturing with artificial intelligence research, 5G deployment, and digital governance initiatives creates mutually reinforcing capabilities that compound over time.

As India develops indigenous AI applications for agriculture, healthcare, education, and governance, the demand for specialized computing hardware optimized for these applications will grow. Domestic semiconductor manufacturing ensures that these critical technologies remain under national control while providing the scale necessary to drive down costs and improve performance.

Strategic Implications for Global Technology Leadership

India’s approach to semiconductor development offers important lessons for other countries seeking to build technological sovereignty without directly challenging established leaders. The strategy demonstrates that technological leadership can be achieved through market creation and ecosystem development rather than pure technological advancement.

This model becomes particularly relevant as artificial intelligence applications diversify beyond the narrow focus on large language models and generative AI that currently dominates technology headlines. The future of AI lies in specialized applications that require domain-specific optimization—exactly the kind of innovation that benefits from integrated hardware and software development capabilities.

The Long View on Innovation Strategy

India’s semiconductor strategy represents a sophisticated understanding of how technological ecosystems develop over time. By focusing on proven technologies and building manufacturing expertise systematically, the country is creating the foundation for future innovation rather than attempting to leapfrog directly to technological leadership.

This patient approach to capability building reflects a mature understanding of industrial development that prioritizes sustainable competitive advantage over short-term market positioning. As global technology markets become increasingly volatile and geopolitically complex, this kind of strategic thinking will prove increasingly valuable.

The true measure of India’s semiconductor strategy will not be found in immediate market share or technological benchmarks, but in the country’s ability to maintain technological sovereignty while contributing to global supply chain resilience. In an industry where success is typically measured in nanometers, India is optimizing for something far more valuable: strategic optionality in an uncertain world.

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This news platform and think tank does not make space for pieces on specific individuals, as this is a space that is reserved for writing that is strictly nationalist. However, we consider it to be incumbent upon us to flag an issue should we consider it to be one that can impact public interest at large. In this case, it concerns the arrival of Gaurav Gogoi, son of late Tarun Gogoi, the longest serving chief minister of Assam who passed away in 2020, as president of the Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC). Tarun Gogoi, a very highly respected person in state politics, had held the position of chief minister for 15 long years in Assam, a state that was till then–and till it saw the departure of Himanta Biswa Sarma, Gogoi senior’s right-hand man, from its fold–a Congress bastion.

Anyone even remotely familiar with the ethnic structure of Assam would expect a certain realignment of ethnic forces as Gaurav arrived on the scene in May this year, his position as Pradesh Congress president having been fortified by the ‘high command’ in Delhi. Gaurav’s performance on the floor of Parliament too had brought him his share of laurels in Assam. Hence the age-old dynasty dynamic of political entitlement would have been a given in his case, as would the rejoicement of certain self-proclaimed jatiyo media houses where content is driven more by political self-interest than interests of the jaati (community).

That said, Gaurav’s initial public meetings and statements to the Press smacked of insecurity, loaded as they were with dangerous portents of oppression, laying bare his layered fears of what he and his party feel are the biggest existential threat to the Congress. “All RSS and Bajrang Dal members who had come in from outside the state should be monitored by the Assam police”, Gaurav said at a public meeting. Import: that deep-set fear of Gaurav and his party of the quiet, systematic work that the RSS and its sister organisations do, grassroots-level social activities being their strongest point, something that no other organization in the country seems to equipped to deliver–on a sustained basis, and in times both of peace and calamity.

The Sangh Parivar works on this tirelessly, and on several fronts simultaneously: reaching out to communities previously ignored and sidelined by the ‘mainstream’, setting up thousands of ‘single-teacher’ schools, protecting marginalized ethnic belief systems and non-mainstream religions, working on history and fighting false narratives created by bluntly biased historians, fighting for majority rights while bringing on board minority communities who have been wronged by their own… The list is endless. It is this that converted the state of Assam, once a Congress stronghold, into a BJP state. As is the case with Tripura and other areas of the Northeast, which lie targetted by ungratefuls such as Bangladesh. Those are the security dividends that the RSS has earned through decades of untiring work in the region.

This fear of organization, the tireless functioning and outreach of the RSS, is something that people such as Rahul Gandhi cannot seem to imagine Congress cadres delivering, their only claim to organized effort being the Independence movement a century ago.

Hence the easier thing for Rahul to do: label the RSS as being an organization that functions like the radical Islamic ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, which across nations advocates a return to the Qurān and the Hadith to ‘reform’ society. Trouble with trying to build that narrative is that the beneficiaries of the work done by the RSS and its affiliates, will never agree with the scion. It is something late Tarun Gogoi too acknowledged.

And yet younger Congress politicians  of the day such as Rahul and Gaurav press on with their efforts. With a visible lack of dedicated workers in their ranks, they are happy to name call and label–their best bet, they seem to believe, at tacking the RSS.

That is not the worrisome bit though… The worrisome part is that both Rahul and Gaurav’s and their party’s long-term strategy in the matter. If history is anything to go by, their push could just be towards criminalizing organisations such as the RSS and Bajrang Dal, while preventing their entry into Assam and the Northeast, where their work brings about social–and hence political—cohesiveness among communities disparate in language, culture, faith and political thought. In a land where Macaulay and his mission have determined the discourse for many decades, the RSS and its affiliates have managed to redefine ‘missionary zeal’. Rahul and Gaurav attempt to bring an end to that by criminally labelling the RSS, their actions hauntingly same as those that were put into effect in the past, which saw the banning of the RSS four times. Every single time, though, the RSS and its its ranks returned, consolidated and stronger.

Currently, Assam emerges as a leading BJP stronghold with Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma not one to hold back be it in words or action. Sarma and the BJP’s success in dealing with the most critical of issues—that of illegal migration from Bangladesh—is what unsettles the Congress, a party that aligns with ‘minorities’ of a certain community that grow increasingly radical in its actions, be it illegally occupying land or illegally acquiring citizenship and voting rights. Sarma and the BJP’s managing to rein them in, while the Congress tries to revive their lifeline in Assam through the same ‘votebank’ is what pushes the state towards a showdown between the two sides. In all of this what the Congress seems not particularly willing to acknowledge is that the Sangh Parivar in the state is protected to quite an extent by a range of judicial orders that have gone in its favour. Attempting to negate this by creating extra-judicial impediments can only make things worse for Rahul, Gaurav and their party. If the fight were to be fair, the Opposition would take decades to even come close to what the RSS has achieved in terms of establishing non-political, grassroots credibility, something they could have done in the decades they were in power. That the BJP continues to win elections in Assam and many parts of the Northeast is proof of the Congress’s failure and the RSS’s success.

It is imperative that the Government of Bharat ignores the protests of that so-called country Bangladesh with regard to our pushing back illegal migrants back into that country, one that we created only to be engulfed by their idea of lebensraum, their “act of aggression”, as the Supreme Court has observed.

The tragedy inflicted on us though is not so much the act of the Bangladeshi state alone, if we can call it that, that is, as it is an act of treason plotted and executed by a large set of people, from our country, who have used illegals to construct a vote-bank using every possible trick in the book, blatantly and shamelessly compromising Bharat’s democracy, way of life, economy, religious composition, community structures, and finally Bharat’s internal and external security.

Take Back Your Illegals, India Tells Bangladesh

MEA spox Randhir Jaiswal says India has urged Dhaka to "expedite nationality verification." pic.twitter.com/hBMiTqUcij

— RT_India (@RT_India_news) May 22, 2025

The cost has been colossal: entire districts in the country encroached on by illegals, decades-long agitations by Bharatiyas that have spilled into protracted militant movements of various kinds costing thousands of lives, unbearable land pressure, religious polarization triggered by the radical political posturing of the entrenched Bangladeshi illegal along with some others, a judicial system further burdened by the process of detection of often-floating Bangladeshi clusters—quite the futile effort, ad infinitum—along with the creation of a parallel administrative structure within the existing system, its only job being to facilitate the entrenching of the illegal Bangladeshi at the behest of certain major political forces that have compromised the country without thinking twice. The long-term implication of this has been the takeover of crucial and strategic legislative positions across states, by Bangladeshis voters who came in long after the Indira-Mujib Pact of 1971, which, ignoring all interests of the people of the Northeastern states made bonafide, with all necessary documentation, the residency of all people who came in from Bangladesh till that point of time. The sympathy from a Sanatani Bharat at that point in time was to be expected: Hindus fleeing an Islamic West Pakistan, had to be accommodated. What followed though was disastrous: a steady flow of the majority Islamic people from Bangladesh, something that for decades has gone unchecked and unabated, leading the country to its current crisis involving illegals. The divisions that this would create in our communities was completely ignored.

India had in that sense won a kinetic war against Pakistan in 1971, only to have hundreds of thousands of East Pakistanis come into our country, engulfing fragile economies and vulnerable communities that were least prepared to handle such an onslaught.

That continual war was to play out on several fronts: (a) the illegal Bangladeshi problem being projected, and believed by mainland states, to be a problem of Northeast India alone (b) the voice of the people of the Northeast who fought against the influx as being the voice of communal, anti-national communities (c) the mindset of states beyond the Northeast that people who had come to the Northeast, especially Assam, from an impoverished, overly densely populated region called Bangladesh to make a living here, would, somehow, not move to the rest of the country. That pipedream that was, quite expectedly, shattered in the decades that followed.

Today, illegals from Bangladesh constitute the most serious pan-India problem that the country deals with, one that involves radical Bangladeshis within the borders of India, communal clashes and civil society disturbances, sleeper-cell activations given their growing proximity to Pakistan that once inflicted Op Searchlight on them, and blatant opposition to the Indian state and its wellbeing. Illegal Bangladeshis have gone against the interests of India where they live illegally, just in the way so-called Bangladesh, a collection of Indian states that we made a country out of, today is one of India’s worst enemies.

It doesn’t take much to figure out the political parties who have brought things to such a pass. They’re there still doing their best to get their illegal-migrant vote-banks the legitimacy that is integral to the survival of these political parties, ones that find themselves sidelined with a rapidly growing nationalist sentiment, something that has propelled the BJP to power at the Centre, along with several states that now recognize the danger of illegals at their doorstep.

The resistance to the detection and deportation process has been multi-layered:

• (a) The IMDT Act, which shows to what length political parties would go to protect the illegal Bangladeshi in India. Scrapped only in 2005, this piece of legislation made way for the illegal Bangladeshi to settle in India easily. Central Act. Passed in 1983. Provisions: (i) Put the onus of proof of proving foreigner status on the state rather than the accused having to prove that he or she is an Indian citizen. (ii) Anyone who wished to complain against an alleged illegal Bangladeshi was required to buy a form to fill up the complaint (iii) If an illegal moved from the jurisdiction of one police station to another, the case against that person would have to be filed all over again
• The lack of an adequate number of Foreigners Tribunals
• The Foreigners Tribunals that existed were not adequately staffed
• A hostile ‘national’ media that insisted on painting the Assamese ‘communal’, chauvinist and anti-‘minority’.
• Certain states making it impossible to fence the international border with so-called Bangladesh, through a multitude of delaying tactics. The problem persists
• Sharp divisions created by certain political parties whose very survival and performance in elections continue to depend on illegal Bangladeshis
• A merciless, no holds barred crushing of the Assam Agitation (1979-85), a process that resulted in some quarters launching militant movements that resulted in a backlash by security forces for decades. The issue of illegal migrants took a back seat during that time, with illegal immigration carrying on unabated and unchecked
• Refusal to implement the NRC which was a demand of the All Assam Students Union. When it did happen, loopholes in the system made the process difficult. However with pressure increasing in the Northeast and the usual expected movement of illegal migrants, they moved to other states and other cities, creating a cheap workforce, while becoming a security threat to the country. The current, urgent requirement of a pan-India NRC is a direct result of the country not heeding the cries of the Northeast that said that it would only be a matter of time before what was perceived and projected to be a regional problem, became a national crisis.

ENEMIES WITHIN AND THE LONG ROAD TO SECURITY

The audacity of forces inimical to Bharat have only grown over the decades, aided and abetted by people who have, at various levels claimed to be secular, inclusive and politically polite. In the ’70s and ’80s the abettors comprised both politicians and some sections of the Press from regions beyond the Northeast, people who wanted the presence of illegal Bangladeshis in strength for a plethora of reasons that included political power, linguistic jingoism at the cost of the country, and a completely anti-national definition of secularism, an anti-majority stand where just about everything Bharatiya needed to be opposed.

Beyond the murderous clamp-down on members of the All Assam Students’ Union that spearheaded the Assam Agitation from 1979 to 1985, hundreds of whom died fighting for the rights of Bharatiyas over those of politically powerful illegal migrants, there was and is an organized syndicate that still represents the illegal Bangladeshi.

SUPREME COURT TO THE RESCUE

After decades of struggle and several legal battles here are the positives that have come about in this war against illegals most of whom are Bangladeshis:

1. Scrapping of the IMDT Act 1983 by the Supreme Court, in 2005
2. The Foreigners (Tribunals for Assam) Order 2006, which was brought about by the Congress government to make it serve the same purpose as the IMDT Act after it was scrapped by the Supreme Court, also declared illegal, in 2006
3. May 8, 2025 ruling by the Supreme Court, with the court declining to intervene in the deportation of illegal Rohingya Muslim migrants from Delhi, saying that if Rohingya refugees in the country were found to be foreigners under Indian laws they will have to be deported.
4. May 19, 2025 ruling by the Supreme Court which turned down the petition of a Sri Lankan Tamil citizen seeking refuge in the country and protection from deportation. “India is not a dharmashala (free shelter) that can entertain refugees from all over the world”, the Court observed.

SO WHAT SHOULD BHARAT DO NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE?

There is no gainsaying the fact that India’s continual conflict with a terror state called Pakistan is a war on multiple fronts, the most ominous among them being a Pakistan-friendly illegal Bangladeshi population that continues to undermine India’s security from within. This population is aided and abetted by certain political parties who also have on their rolls some handpicked media persons, both of the country and international houses, along with a set of lawyers of questionable integrity, who have made it their business to disrupt the pushback process of illegal Bangladeshis into so-called Bangladesh.

If the experience of the past many decades, buttressed by the legal sanction that the government now has from the country’s Supreme Court the following needs to be done to ensure the safety of Bharat and its people:

1. Make detection and pushbacks a central subject using the strongest central agencies to carry out the exercise. Needs to be tailormade to be applicable in states that stand against detection and deportation of illegals.
2. Declare indefinite curfew, empowering our border troops with shoot at sight orders along the country’s eastern borders
3. Tweak laws and have in place a structure such as the Unified Command that has been used in militancy affected states such as Assam and make it directly answerable to the Union Home Ministry with regard to the detection and push back of illegal Bangladeshis and Rohingyas
4. Given the activities of their parent countries such as Bangladesh, declare illegals from there as terrorists and make all anti-terror laws applicable in dealing with them
5. Empower our forces and, where required, the local police with legislations such as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and the Assam Disturbed Areas Act to deal with complaints of abetment of terror, or support for Bangladesh and Pakistan
6. Make way for provisions that take away the power of errant state governments with regard to administration of border blocks and villages. Make them answerable only to state governors and the Centre
7. Use police personnel of the Northeastern states, the worst affected by the illegal-migrant crisis, to detect illegals across the country. They have suffered and hence they know their language, their accents, their way of life, their targeted areas of livelihood
8. Make way for zero FIRs, and a strong and modern data bank to track down illegals
9. Implement the most effective NRC without any further delay across the country
10. Deal with forces who speak for illegals with an iron hand and ensure they do not have legal reprieve.
11. Make detection and push backs a summary exercise. It is a deterrent Bharat needs to put in place.
12. This country has lost hundreds of lives to illegal migrants and their vote-bank supporters, not to mention land and
    livelihood. Bharat needs access to the sea. So-called Bangladesh comprises districts of Bharat. With that country, one that we created, becoming a threat, we need to have them back.

Our country is in the midst of a prolonged war, on multiple fronts both on its borders, and internally. It is time we sorted things out.

SUGGESTED READING:

https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/how-congress-misused-foreigners-act-in-assam-1304900-2018-08-03

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/right-to-reside-is-only-for-indian-citizens-not-for-rohingyas-rules-supreme-court/articleshow/121019472.cms?from=mdr

https://www.wionews.com/india-news/-india-not-dharmashala-struggling-with-140-crore-sc-junks-sri-lankan-s-plea-against-deportation-1747653958571?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAYnJpZBExa1h4RGlkeHdFWWVJaVFNawEeFVCcW343kkSyfOQ7OlzSj_xhMK9bxrM6DCSo-PDRYTPdABxqwvD79soDTeo_aem_mGOP8rsEgbJ2QVWyjhXYxw