Capability vs Autonomy Part II: Why a Rafale–Su-57 Combination Makes Sense Only Under Sovereign Conditions

Things are movimng fast. Within days of fresh information emerging around the highly debated acquisition of 114 Rafale fighters, a parallel development has entered the strategic conversation: the possible induction of around 60 Su-57E aircraft—evaluated not as competitors to Rafale, but as platforms intended for an entirely different operational role.

This sequencing matters. The Rafale debate was never about rejecting capability; it was about questioning whether India was acquiring capability without sufficient autonomy. The conclusion of the Rafale discussion was clear: without meaningful software control, weapons sovereignty, and deep localisation, even the most advanced aircraft risks becoming a strategically constrained asset.

The emergence of the Su-57E discussion does not overturn that conclusion. It reinforces it.

The question now confronting Indian airpower planners is not whether Rafale or Su-57 is superior. It is whether India can consciously assemble complementary platforms into a coherent force architecture—one that separates roles, absorbs risk intelligently, and advances autonomy rather than diluting it.

Nothing about the Rafale–Su-57 discourse negates the central argument that capability without autonomy is hollow. Software control, weapons sovereignty, and meaningful localisation remain non-negotiable principles.

India’s airpower gap today is functional rather than numerical. The Indian Air Force lacks a stealthy Day-One penetration platform optimised for deep strike and SEAD, a true fifth-generation air-dominance fighter, and a force structure that clearly distinguishes between penetration, orchestration, and sustained strike roles.

Rafale, particularly in its F4 and future F5 configurations, is best understood as a network-centric strike coordinator and sensor-fusion node. It excels in situational awareness, precision strike, and command-and-control functions, but it is not designed to spearhead penetration into heavily defended airspace on Day One without dedicated enablers.

The Su-57E, if inducted, must be understood correctly. It is not a silver-bullet air-superiority platform. Its relevance lies in its potential role as a stealth-enabled strike aircraft capable of penetrating contested airspace, delivering internal-bay weapons, and absorbing the highest operational risk—thereby reducing the burden on non-stealth platforms.

There is no contradiction between critiquing Rafale’s autonomy deficit and arguing for a Rafale–Su-57 combination. The combination only works if Rafale evolves into a sovereign command-and-network backbone and Su-57 is inducted as a limited-number penetration and SEAD asset. Neither can substitute for AMCA.

Weapons sovereignty remains the decisive factor. Aircraft do not fight wars; weapons ecosystems do. Any future architecture must ensure Indian weapons are first-class citizens, enable high–low mixes during sustained conflict, and prevent wartime readiness from being hostage to external approvals.

Operating two advanced foreign fighters is not inefficiency if sovereignty and leverage are preserved. Strategic optionality enhances bargaining power, mitigates political risk, and buys time for indigenous programmes without doctrinal stagnation.

AMCA remains the non-negotiable end state. Rafale and Su-57 are interim instruments, not destinations. If AMCA slips significantly, no combination of imported platforms will compensate for the resulting strategic vacuum.

The red line therefore remains unchanged: no platform is acceptable without autonomy, no combination is useful without weapons sovereignty, and no interim solution should undermine the indigenous end state.

India does not need more aircraft. It needs more control. Any acquisition that advances that objective deserves consideration. Any acquisition that does not—regardless of sophistication—remains capability on lease.